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Jordan’s dilemma: Can large parties still be intimate? Redeﬁning
public, private and the misuse of the digital person
Marion Oswald*
Department of Law, University of Winchester, Winchester, UK
In the early twentieth century, it was still possible to be relatively anonymous at a large
gathering, to be visible, yet not the subject of detailed scrutiny or surveillance. A century
on, the impact of digital technology has reduced our expectations of privacy, whether
physical or online. This article discusses the interpretation of ‘private’ and ‘public’ in
today’s technologically enabled world by reference in particular to case-law on the
reasonable expectation of privacy. The article goes on to discuss the potential of
technological methods for controlling, blocking and obfuscating digital information
and devices as means for individuals to regain control over their privacy, ultimately
concluding that these technologies, themselves alone, do not provide a long term
solution to privacy harms. Finally, the article puts forward an alternative model for
consideration pursuant to which certain information about individuals available to the
‘masses’ digitally or on the Internet, or which can be generated from such
information, should no longer be regarded as ‘public’ in the sense of there being no
privacy in respect of it. Thus, the term ‘private’ when applied to the digital world
must be redeﬁned.
Keywords: privacy; technology; digital; private; public; surveillance
Introduction – the large party moves online
At one of the Great Gatsby’s spectacular parties, the golf champion Jordan Baker remarked
to Nick Carraway that she likes large parties: ‘They’re so intimate. At small parties there
isn’t any privacy.’1
At ﬁrst glance, this statement seems nonsensical. How can there be intimacy – a closely
personal or private relationship2 – at a party where ‘the cars from New York are parked ﬁve
deep in the drive’?3
So what did Jordan mean by ‘privacy’? She cannot mean secrecy, being totally unob-
served or hidden. She may not recognise Brandeis and Warren’s famous ‘right to be
let alone’ as deﬁning her concept of privacy.4 My right to be let alone from what? she
might have asked. This concept of privacy, as Solove has argued, fails to provide much
guidance.5
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1F Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (1925) ch 3.
2Oxford English Dictionary.
3F Scott Fitzgerald (n 1).
4Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193.
5Daniel J Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press 2009) 17.
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So does she mean a right to control the communication of information about herself?6
Jordan was living in an era without instant systematic access to information. Even so
Gatsby could not control the stories circulating at the party about him: he had killed a
man; he was a German spy during World War I; he was in the American army; he was
an ‘Oxford’ man. Jordan herself had been accused of cheating in a golf tournament, a
row that ‘nearly reached the newspapers’ but then died away.7 As a well-known sports-
woman, Jordan may have found this accusation upsetting but would she have thought of
it as private? It is unlikely that she would have believed that she owned the information
– that she had a quasi-property right in it8 – recognising that ‘personal information rarely
belongs to just one individual; it is often formed in relationships with others’.9 Indeed,
Nick Carraway recalled that the scandal and Jordan’s name had remained together in his
mind.
Rather than considering privacy as secrecy or as a right to own information, Jordan
appears concerned about being free from worry about disturbance or detailed scrutiny
from other people. She expects space from others, even when she is with other people.10
This is a party full of ‘casual innuendo and introductions forgotten on the spot, and enthu-
siastic meetings between women who never knew each other’s names’.11 Thus Jordan can
be in public, in the sense of being observable, but without being the focus of public atten-
tion; she would not have been able to achieve this at a smaller gathering where everyone
knew her name. The extent to which information about her is collected and used certainly
contributes to whether she feels free from detailed scrutiny, but her concerns seem wider
than this: a wish to avoid intrusion in terms of offensive observation and judgement.12
She might look favourably on the general idea of public privacy or freedom from unjustiﬁed
surveillance in public places as a way of protecting her individual personality and dignity,
but perhaps struggle to pin down when she had a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in any
particular place.
In Strasbourg case law, the reasonable expectation of privacy test is one of the factors
relevant to the question of whether Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights
(right to respect for private life) is engaged. In the UK Supreme Court judgment in Catt,
Lord Sumption said:
Given the expanded concept of private life in the jurisprudence of the Convention, the test
cannot be limited to cases where a person can be said to have a reasonable expectation
about the privacy of his home or personal communications. It must extend to every occasion
on which a person has a reasonable expectation that there will be no inference with the
broader right of personal autonomy recognised in the case law of the Strasbourg court. This
is consistent with the recognition that there may be some matters about which there is a reason-
able expectation of privacy, notwithstanding that they occur in public and are patent to all the
world.13
6Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum, New York 1967) 7.
7F Scott Fitzgerald (n 1).
8Paul Schwartz, ‘Property, Privacy, and Personal Data’ (2004) 117 Harv L Rev 2055.
9Solove (n 5) 27–28.
10Daniel J Solove, ‘ATaxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 (3) University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
477, 553.
11F Scott Fitzgerald (n 1).
12Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, ‘The New Intrusion’ (2012) 88 Notre Dame L Rev 25.
13R (Catt) v Association of Chief Police Ofﬁcers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland [2015]
UKSC 9 [10].
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Despite the acknowledgement that it can be possible to be private in public, the test remains
open to criticism on the grounds that it ‘is highly dependent on the interpretation and appli-
cation of what qualiﬁes as a reasonable expectation of privacy’, often a matter of guess-
work.14 In her home country however, Jordan’s ability to enforce her privacy at Gatsby’s
large party may be even more curtailed. In Katz, the US Supreme Court said: ‘What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or ofﬁce, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection.’15 This approach would hold that once something is
public, its protection (against unreasonable searches and seizures in Katz) is lost. Some
tort cases have recognised the concept of ‘limited privacy’, the idea that when an individual
reveals information to one or more persons, she retains a reasonable expectation that they
will not disseminate it further, although ‘American law eschews a categorical answer’ as to
when a limited disclosure will render information ‘public’ for tort law purposes.16 ‘Hard-
line’ cases however have rejected the basic premise of limited privacy.17 Nowadays, the
hard-line approach has extended not only to the question of public and private physical
spaces but to the impact of technology, for instance, so-called ‘butt calls’: calls made inad-
vertently by a mobile phone left unlocked in a jacket or back pocket. InHuff (a decision that
considered the reasonable expectation of privacy in the context of wiretap legislation), the
US Court of Appeals held that:
a person who knowingly operates a device that is capable of inadvertently exposing his con-
versations to third-party listeners and fails to take simple precautions to prevent such exposure
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to statements that are exposed to
an outsider by the inadvertent operation of that device.18
This was despite the fact that Mr Huff did not intend to make the call and regarded the con-
tents of the conversation overheard by the phone as private.
This brings us onto the question of whether Jordan would hold the same views today.
Ninety years on, would she still believe that large parties are intimate? In 1925, Jordan
inhabited only a ‘real world’ space, her privacy threatened primarily by tangible forms of
intrusion – photographs, physical surveillance, wire-tapping, media gossip – and often
with technologies only available to the State. In the Internet era, ‘the most powerful preda-
tors in terms of privacy violations have become we ourselves’.19 She could be said to be
effectively attending a digital ‘large party’ with an unlimited number of often hidden
actors armed with technologies which have the tracking, identiﬁcation and information
retrieval abilities unheard of in the 1920s.
Before the party (at a ‘real world’ location, a private party on private premises), this cen-
tury’s Jordan might type an update onto her blog – Diary of a Female Golfer – which is
written under an assumed name; she takes care not to mention real names or sensitive infor-
mation about relationships or work. She sends a message on her Twitter account, intending
this for the followers that she knows. Unbeknown to her, her Twitter account has location
14Anne SY Cheung, ‘Rethinking Public Privacy in the Internet Era: A Study of Virtual Persecution by
the Internet Crowd’ (2009) 2 JML 191, 200.
15Katz v United States (1967) 389 US 347, 351.
16Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, ‘A Social Networks Theory of Privacy’ (2005) 72 University of Chicago
Law Review 919, 939.
17ibid 943–46.
18Huff et al v Spaw 2015 WL 4430466 (6th Cir. 21 July 2015), 12.
19Cheung (n 14), 195.
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tracking enabled. When she arrives at the party, other guests take photographs of her,
perhaps via a wearable device which makes ‘the procedure of taking a photo or ﬁlming
imperceptible to the third person who becomes the subject of the photo or the ﬁlm’.20
They use facial recognition apps to identify her, and post messages on Twitter. A drone
hovers overhead, operated by a journalist, live-streaming footage to Periscope. In this
decade, an allegation of cheating by a famous sportswoman would certainly have circulated
on social media before making the newspapers; Nick Carraway can re-read every online
account with a few clicks on his smart phone, even if the allegation later turned out to
be untrue. An Internet troll ‘outs’ her as being the author of Diary of a Female Golfer.
As for Gatsby, he would have little chance of remaining anonymous to strangers at his
own party, his face and every story written about him available via a simple Internet search.
It is almost certain that today’s Jordan would ﬁnd a large party a lot less intimate. Tech-
nology has enabled the physical space to be intermingled with the virtual and the Internet
risks reducing her personality to an assemblage of disparate facts, inferences, presumptions
and opinions, information that as a combined mass, would previously have been available
only to close acquaintances attending a small party. As Brunton has commented ‘our online
lives are no longer just our online lives. They are our lives.’21 The immediate availability of
that information, and the ability of strangers (whether physically present or online) to ident-
ify her and associate her with it, is likely to become of increased importance to her. So must
Jordan accept the changes to her privacy that a near-century has brought?
‘Public’, ‘private’, technology and the law
Privacy and data protection laws, related freedom of information and freedom of speech
interests, and intrusion torts all have a role to play and ride to a large extent on the concepts
of ‘public’, ‘private’ and the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’. This section will explore
these concepts in the light of selected EU and US case-law, recognising that privacy issues,
and the deﬁnitions of public and private, are not limited to particular types of claims. Jordan
appreciates that it is not feasible to expect absolute invisibility either physically or digitally
but looks instead to achieve relative anonymity or privacy in certain contexts. She seeks the
same comfort digitally and online as she found at Gatsby’s physical large party. Silva and
Reed argue that in the ‘real’ world, the extensive time and effort involved in the process of
identiﬁcation means that anonymity can be thought of as a binary state, whereas in the
online world ‘even the common citizen has access to a huge amount of information
resources’, thus weakening the relative strength of anonymity.22 They use the underlying
structure of the Internet and digital technologies – the often hidden connection between
user, machine, IP address and Internet Service Provider – to argue for an expectation of rela-
tive anonymity in the cyber world, concluding that once a user makes information available
to the masses online in a particular situation, an individual cannot expect not to be named in
another situation.23 These arguments are open to debate. First, it is hard to see how such a
20Andreas Kotsios, ‘Privacy in an Augmented Reality’ (2015) 23(2) Int J Law Info Tech 157, 168.
21Finn Brunton interviewed in The Slate: Anna Diamond, ‘Does That Look LikeMe?’ The Slate (Sep-
tember 14, 2015) <http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/09/an_interview_
with_obfuscation_co_author_ﬁnn_brunton_about_online_privacy.single.html> accessed March
2016.
22Sara Nogueira Silva and Chris Reed, ‘You Can’t Always Get What You Want: Relative Anonymity
in Cyberspace’ (2015) 12(1) SCRIPTed 37, 38.
23ibid 44.
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stark distinction between real space and cyberspace can still hold water. Digital technol-
ogies operating in real world settings link to online search, investigation and identiﬁcation
technologies in order to return information to those real world settings (an example being
the deployment of facial recognition technologies within shops, not only for crime-preven-
tion but to enable the retailer to identity age, gender and race, with the potential for digital
photographs taken in the real world to be compared to those online24). The process is so
interlinked that it could almost be said that there is no longer any point in trying to dis-
tinguish the real and the cyber. If so, it would follow from Silva and Reed’s position that
individuals should expect little anonymity in the real as well as the cyber world. In addition,
this distinction between real and cyber tends to lead to the view that anything online can no
longer be (or be expected to be) anonymous or private (because the Internet’s infrastructure
facilitates tracking and identiﬁcation), whereas in the real world, physical boundaries allow
us to seek out private or secret spaces in which we have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Jordan ﬁnds this situation unacceptable. She regards the advice not to put anything on
the Internet that you would not want to see on the front page of a newspaper as absurd. She
thinks of her tweets as the equivalent of having a chat with her friends at home,25 and her
blog as a ‘communication channel to friends and family’.26 As a digital native, she is less
concerned about protecting her data from government intrusion, marketers or spammers,
and more concerned about keeping control over her personal space and protecting social
boundaries.27 She might understand Jones’s view that the online world is ‘a social space
in its own right’, one where she might divulge more than she generally does in the off-
line world.28 So she would feel a sense of shock and intrusion if unintended audiences
accessed her online persona.29 She wants to attend Gatsby’s next large party free from
the fear that strangers can digitally identify her, proﬁle her and circulate her image.
Surely the law will support her? She is disappointed to learn that the situation is far from
clear.
24Asher-Schapiro, ‘Facial Recognition Technology Is Big Business – And It’s Coming for You’ Vice
News (13 August 2015) <https://news.vice.com/article/facial-recognition-technology-is-big-business-
and-its-coming-for-you> accessed March 2016.
25A Dash, ‘What Is Public? It’s So Simple, Right?’ The Message (24 July 2014) ‘What if the public
speech on Facebook and Twitter is more akin to a conversation happening between two people at a
restaurant? Or two people speaking quietly at home, albeit near a window that happens to be open
to the street? And if more than a billion people are active on various social networking applications
each week, are we saying that there are now a billion public ﬁgures?’; Also see Vincent Miller, The
Crisis of Presence in Contemporary Culture: Ethics, Privacy and Speech in Mediated Social Life
(SAGE, 2015) 97 which discusses the breakdown of the divide between writing and conversation
online and the ‘collapse’ of public and private audiences:
Unfortunately, outside readers and legal regimes often do not acknowledge the distinction
between private and public talk, as it is usually assumed by both that once something is
posted on the web and is potentially available to the general public, it becomes a public state-
ment and thereby open to public and legal scrutiny.
26Christopher Wienberg and Andrew S Gordon, ‘Insights on Privacy and Ethics from the Web’s Most
Proliﬁc Storytellers’ (2015) Proceedings of ACM Web Science 2015, 28 June–1 July 2015, Oxford,
UK [4.2].
27D Bradbury, ‘The Kids Are Alright’ (2015) 10(1) Engineering & Technology 30, 32.
28Brian Christopher Jones, ‘The Online/Ofﬂine Cognitive Divide: Implications for Law’ (2016) 13(1)
SCRIPTed 84, 89.
29Patricia Sanchez Abril, ‘Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World’ (2007) 21(1) Harvard
Journal of Law & Technology 2, 16.
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The public/private dichotomy
The public/private dichotomy offers little assistance in delineating Jordan’s privacy rights.
Nissenbaum argues that:
its limitations have come to light as digital information technologies radically alter the terms
under which others – individuals and private organizations as well as government – have
access to us and to information about us in what are traditionally understood as private and
public domains.30
The decision in the US case of Huff (mentioned above) is an extreme example of such limit-
ations. A person who operates a device which ‘might grant access to others’31 does not
exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy, even though the overheard conversation was
conducted in a hotel room and intended to be private: an example of the functionalities
of the technologies (perhaps unknown to the user) dictating the resultant privacy protection.
In the wider context of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and Government surveillance,
Heymann’s concern is for the impact that technology now available to ordinary citizens
has on the deﬁnition of ‘public’ (and therefore on what is a ‘search’ in the US):
It is not that the law has changed. Ofﬁcials have long been entitled to observe what is in plain
view from a public location. What has changed dramatically is what can now be seen from
areas open to the public…Now observations from great distances can detect much by using
highly sophisticated lenses and other sensors. Moreover, modern surveillance sees what the
inattention of a human viewer might have caused to be overlooked and modern surveillance
remembers and archives what might otherwise have been forgotten.32
Heymann argues that not only should Government use of such technologies be more
closely regulated, but that legislation ‘could forbid anyone – private individuals as well
as governments – from engaging in certain forms of surveillance of their neighbors…
This would prevent the area of privacy from continuing to narrow as it appears that it
might do.’33
Reasonable expectation of privacy
In reviewing Strasbourg Article 8 case law (and putting aside for a moment the unlikelihood
of the Convention ever applying in the US), Jordan ﬁnds herself uncertain as to the extent of
her rights. She feels that she should have a reasonable expectation of privacy at the party
and she is encouraged by the decision in Egeland that taking a photograph of an individual
without consent may engage Article 8.34 She remains unsure however as to the factors that
should be taken into account at the second stage, balancing her Article 8 rights against the
right of freedom of expression in Article 10: the Court’s reasoning has been described as
‘unsatisfactory and unclear’.35 The apparent tension between the Strasbourg court’s
decision in Von Hannover v Germany36 and its subsequent decision in Von Hannover v
30Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context (Stanford University Press 2010) 117.
31Huff (n 18), 11.
32Philip B Heymann, ‘An Essay on Domestic Surveillance’ (2015) 3(2) Lawfare Research Paper
Series, 10.
33ibid 20.
34Egeland and Hanseid v Norway (App No 34438/04) ECHR 16 July 2009.
35Kirsty Hughes, ‘Photographs in Public Places and Privacy’ (2009) 1(2) JML, 159, 171.
36Von Hannover v Germany (App No 59320/00) ECHR 24 September 2004.
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Germany (No. 2)37 leaves open the distinction between a ‘public’ and ‘private’ individual
and arguably relaxes the requirement that an image must contribute to a ‘debate of general
interest’.38 The majority decision in the UK case of Campbell39 is concerning, in particular
as regards the treatment of photographs taken in a public place and the extent to which
inconsequential information will be regarded as private. In Campbell, Lady Hale noted
(obiter) that photographs and the covert way in which they were taken were not of them-
selves objectionable:
The activity photographed must be private. If this had been, and had been presented as, a
picture of Naomi Campbell going about her business in a public street, there could have
been no complaint.40
Lady Hale further observed that readers of newspapers will be interested in how Ms Camp-
bell looks ‘if and when she pops out to the shops for a bottle of milk’.41
Along similar lines, Lord Hoffman said:
The famous and even the not so famous who go out in public must accept that they may be
photographed without their consent, just as they may be observed by others without their
consent.42
Jordan takes Lord Hoffman’s statement to mean that she must tolerate photographs of
herself in her daily life and in public places, even though these make no contribution to
a ‘debate of general interest’. But what of photographs of the ‘not so famous’ that many
would ﬁnd intrusive or even creepy, such as the covertly taken photographs posted
(some with titles such as ‘Three little pigs’) on the Facebook and Tumblr pages ‘Women
Who Eat On Tubes’43? The website’s founder openly admitted that he was ‘watching’
and ‘photographing’, styling his own activities as an artistic ‘observational study’.44
Others regarded the project as crossing a boundary into voyeuristic stranger-shaming.
The decision in Weller,45 which focused on the English tort of misuse of private infor-
mation, came close to resolving the questions left by Campbell and Von Hannover as
regards photographs of everyday activities. The case involved the publication by the
Mail Online in the UK of un-pixelated photographs of the children of famous musician
Paul Weller. The photographs showed the family engaged in everyday activities in a
public place – shopping and sitting in a café – in Los Angeles. Dingemans J held, applying
the grounds laid out in Murray,46 that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy; the
photographs showed the emotions on the children’s faces while on a family outing, ‘one
of the chief attributes of their respective personalities’,47 and the newspaper knew that
37Von Hannover v Germany (no. 2) (App No 40660/08) ECHR 7 February 2012.
38Von Hannover v Germany (n 36) [60].
39Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers (2004) UKHL 22.
40ibid [154].
41ibid.
42ibid [73].
43<http://womenwhoeatontubes.tumblr.com/> accessed March 2016.
44‘WomenWho Eat On Tubes: The Fightback Begins’ Channel 4 News (11 April 2014) <http://www.
channel4.com/news/women-who-eat-on-tube-founder-were-all-wildlife> accessed March 2016.
45Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1163 (QB).
46Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446.
47Weller (n 45) 170–71.
Information & Communications Technology Law 7
the photographs had been taken without consent. Even though the photographs were taken
in a jurisdiction where publication would have been lawful, the judge concluded that the tort
of misuse of private information still applied to the publication of the photographs in the
UK. In terms of the balance between the children’s Article 8 rights and the newspaper’s
rights under Article 10, the judge came down in favour of the children, concluding that
the publication of the photographs did not contribute to a debate of general interest. The
decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal, Lord Tomlinson MR observing that the
court does not necessarily require evidence of harm; it can apply common sense and its
own experience regarding the undermining of the child, and the risk of bullying.48
Would such expectations of privacy be limited to children, Jordan might ask? Hughes
concludes that it is possible that the reasoning in Weller could apply to photographs of
adults in public places; in any event it is not ruled out.49 An adult, for instance, the non-
famous partner of a public ﬁgure, could seek to show a reasonable expectation of
privacy if he was photographed and identiﬁed by name, although this may be dealt with
by pixelating his face.50 And what of public, famous or semi-famous ﬁgures such as
Jordan? Hughes states that it may also be possible to argue that Weller should apply to
public ﬁgures ‘who have sought a degree of privacy’, thus bringing the domestic courts
in line with Strasbourg.51
One could speculate how this might apply to those using non-traditional routes of online
publication such as social media and bloggings sites. Could there be an expectation of
privacy if a photograph of an everyday activity was taken by an everyman-on-the-street
and then posted to a social media site with an identifying comment? Consent is very
likely to be absent in those circumstances. It is arguable that pixilation (at the very least)
should occur on such Internet sites unless consent can be demonstrated. If so, who
would take primary responsibility for ensuring this happens: the individual user who has
taken the photograph, the person who has uploaded it to the site, the one who has taken
steps to identify the individual or the provider of the online service?
Kotsios argues that under EU data protection law (often regarded as a sub-set of
privacy) consent must be given by the third person for the user of a wearable device to
take a photo of an individual, upload it and use facial recognition on it.52 It is well estab-
lished that an individual can be a ‘data controller’ under EU data protection law if the dom-
estic purposes exemption does not apply.53 Kotsios points to the Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party opinion on social media which states that a high number of contacts on
social media ‘could’ be an indication that the household exemption does not apply, as
would extending access beyond self-selected contacts.54 The Working Party goes on to
note however that even if the domestic exemption does not apply, other exemptions
might, such as the exemption for literary expression and in any event a balance must be
struck between privacy and freedom of expression. The new EU Regulation continues
the domestic exemption approach. It clariﬁes that a purely personal or household activity
falling outside data protection law is one ‘without a connection with a professional or
48Weller and Ors v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1176 [41].
49Kirsty Hughes, ‘Publishing Photographs Without Consent’ (2014) 6(2) JML 180, 187–88.
50ibid 188.
51ibid.
52Kotsios (n 20) 179.
53Case C-212/13 Ryneš v Úrad pro ochranu osobních údaju [2014]; Case C101/01 Bodil Lindqvist
[2003].
54WP 163, 0189/09/EN, Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking, 6.
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commercial activity’ and including ‘social networking and online activity’ undertaken in
the context of such personal activity.55 So, putting to one side the practical difﬁculties of
enforcing against individuals, the data protection position is by no means clear cut.
Technological functionality and privacy
Jordan ﬁnds further examples of technological functionality impacting on resultant privacy
protection. She is discouraged by the ‘Night Jack’ case in which the author of an anon-
ymous blog was refused an injunction preventing the publication of his identity. The blog-
ger’s claim was based upon the publication of allegedly private information in
contravention of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights. It failed the
ﬁrst step: whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the
information in question. Eady J held that blogging is essentially a public rather than a
private activity.56 He also determined that even though a blogger may take steps to disguise
their identity, as Jordan has done, it is a ‘signiﬁcantly further step’ to say that if others can
determine the blogger’s identity, they should be prevented from revealing it.57 The judge
went on to consider in some detail the stage two balancing test should he have been
wrong about stage one, concluding that because of the blogger’s role as a police ofﬁcer
and the nature of the political comments made in the blog, there was a considerable
public interest in his identity being known. It should be emphasised however that the
claim failed at step one, whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rel-
evant information in the ﬁrst place. Reviewing this case, Hughes concludes that the decision
leaves bloggers very vulnerable; it seems to render privacy settings redundant if another is
capable of circumventing them.58
Another criticism that could be made of the decision is that it fails to acknowledge that
the majority of blogs are personal diary types, providing bloggers with a unique opportunity
for expressive privacy.59 McCullagh comments that:
Bloggers are aware of a risk posed by external parties who might be interested in collecting or
collating the information they post; thus they seek to restrict their blog readership and content.
Also, the comments reveal that bloggers were likely not to blog about controversial social,
moral or philosophical issues which would draw negative responses or criticism from
readers or members of wider society. This suggests that bloggers consciously and intentionally
negotiate the boundary between public and private.60
Other decisions have taken a more nuanced approach to information published ‘publicly’
on the Internet. Rocknroll61 concerned photographs of the claimant, partially naked,
taken at a private party on private premises. The claimant had recently married the
actress Kate Winslet, his second wife, and the defendant intended to publish the photo-
graphs in the Sun newspaper. The photographs were taken by another guest and posted
on his Facebook page, where they became accessible to the general public due to a later
change in the privacy settings.
55Regulation (EU) 2016/679 Recital (18).
56The Author of a Blog v Times Newspapers [2009] EWHC 1358 (QB) [11].
57ibid [9].
58Kirsty Hughes, ‘No Reasonable Expectation of Anonymity?’ (2010) 2(2) JML 169, 175.
59Karen McCullagh, ‘Blogging: Self Presentation and Privacy’ (2008) 17(1) ICTL 3, 19.
60ibid 14.
61Mr Edward Rocknroll v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWHC 24 (Ch).
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Briggs J rejected the argument that the photographs had come into the public domain
‘so as to be beyond recall’62 although it has to be said that the judge did lay emphasis
on the lack of evidence of widespread public inspection of the photos:
No internet search of the claimant by his name would have revealed them, nor even a simple
search or inspection of the wall-page or home-page of [the] Facebook account. The probability
is, on the present evidence, that the photographs would only have been found either as the result
of very expert, expensive and diligent research, or as the result of a tip-off by someone who
knew about them and their whereabouts.63
One wonders though if this case would have had a different outcome if evidence had
been put forward to show that facial recognition and proﬁling technology (of the sort
generally available to the normal citizen) could easily retrieve the photographs on
other sites to which they had been transferred. Would then the judge have concluded
that a line had been crossed such that there was no longer any privacy left to be
protected?
In Morley, the Upper Tribunal overturned the First-Tier Tribunal and held that the
details of youth council members held by a local council were exempt from disclosure
under the UK’s Freedom of Information Act 2000, even though some of the names had
been publicly visible on the group’s Facebook page.64 The Upper Tribunal rejected the
argument that, by putting themselves on Facebook, the members had consented to their
information being used in another way.65,66 This might be viewed as an example of Nissen-
baum’s contextual privacy theory in action.67 The First-Tier decision certainly failed to give
sufﬁcient consideration to the difference between information held by a public authority
and that held in a private context, and the overall context in which personal data was dis-
closed on the Facebook page. Nissenbaum’s theory has been criticised as being accurate
only where there is a relationship between the information discloser and disclosee, not
the case when information is made available to the masses online.68 This criticism is not
entirely invalidated by theMorley decision. Although the case concerned in part names dis-
closed on a Facebook page, the information requested was held by the local authority, with
which the individuals had a relationship. The existence of the Facebook page was used by
the requestor as an argument that the youth councillors should have no expectation of
privacy in the personal details held separately by the local authority, an argument dismissed
by the Upper Tribunal. The case did not consider the transfer or use of the personal details
disclosed on the Facebook page and what an appropriate ﬂow of such information might
have been, a decision that is likely to be little more than educated speculation. It may be
feasible however to agree upon categories of information uses and ﬂows that are not
appropriate.
62ibid [20].
63ibid [25].
64Surrey Heath Borough Council v Information Commissioner and John Morley [2014] UKUT 0339
(AAC).
65ibid 6–7.
66For a critique of the First-Tier decision, see Marion Oswald, ‘Facebook group implies consent to
disclosure of personal data’ (2013) 3(1) International Data Privacy Law 61.
67The ‘right to privacy is neither a right to secrecy nor a right to control but a right to appropriate ﬂow
of personal information’ Nissenbaum (n 30) 127.
68Silva and Reed (n 22) 44.
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Inappropriate use of publicly available information
Inappropriate use of publicly available information was dealt with in the Northern Irish case
of CG.69 CG was convicted in 2007 of a number of sex offences against children, served a
sentence of imprisonment and was released on licence in 2012. McCloskey operated a Face-
book page called ‘Keeping our Kids Safe from Predators 2’ on which he posted a photo-
graph of CG and an article from the Irish News at the time of CG’s conviction.
Comments on the Facebook page posted by others included abusive and violent language
about CG and members of his family and comments identifying CG’s location and provid-
ing identifying details about CG and his children. As Stephens J described it, McCloskey
was in effect ‘gathering all the available information he could obtain about all the sex offen-
ders in Northern Ireland and publishing that information on his proﬁle/page’.70
CG sued both McCloskey and Facebook on the grounds of misuse of private infor-
mation, breach of Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ECHR and harassment. Stephens J used the cat-
egories of sensitive personal data in the UK’s Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), and in
particular sex life and the commission of an offence, to provide ‘a useful touchstone as
to what information is deemed to be private’ for the purposes of the tort of misuse of
private information, and in relation to the balancing exercise between CG’s Article 8
rights andMcCloskey’s Article 10 rights.71 The court concluded that CG had an expectation
of privacy in the following information (individually and in combination):
(a) Any photograph of him that could be used to identify where he lived and increase
the risk of harassment of him and his family;
(b) His name, if used in conjunction with other information which might identify
where he lived;
(c) His present address or description of the area in which he lived;
(d) His previous address/area where he lived if this could be used to identify his
present address;
(e) His criminal convictions except as ought to be disclosed in accordance with public
protection arrangements in Northern Ireland;
(f) The risks that he posed to the public except as ought to be disclosed in accordance
with those public protection arrangements;
(g) Information about his family.72
In considering the balance between Article 8 and Article 10, the judge considered
whether McCloskey could have availed himself of any defence or exemption under the
DPA. It was determined that McCloskey’s activities did not fall within any of the schedule
2 and 3 conditions necessary for the processing of sensitive personal data. Even if McClos-
key’s activities could be classiﬁed as journalism, McCloskey could not believe that his
activities were in the public interest as required by section 32. The judge concluded that
the balance came down ﬁrmly in favour of CG; the information published in the judge’s
view harmed the public interest, created a risk of re-offending and incited violence and
hatred.73 Although the judge made no determination as to whether Facebook was a data
69CG v Facebook Ireland Limited and Joseph McCloskey [2015] NIQB 11.
70ibid [70].
71ibid [79].
72ibid [83].
73ibid [98].
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controller under the DPA, he ruled that it was also a publisher and had misused private
information from the date on which it had been put on notice by the claimant (Facebook’s
defence under the E-Commerce Directive therefore failed).
Does Jordan also have an expectation of privacy in all the above categories of infor-
mation, such that she should be able to control its dissemination absent any public interest
justiﬁcation? This conclusion cannot be reached with any certainty. Indeed, the CG decision
could be criticised for placing too much emphasis on the DPA’s deﬁnition of sensitive per-
sonal data. Information could be sensitive, giving an individual certain rights in respect of it
under the DPA, but not private. It is difﬁcult to understand how CG’s image (taken as it was
from a newspaper article) and the fact of his conviction for serious offences could be said to
be private, particularly since such a relatively short period of time had passed since the con-
viction. If McCloskey’s site had limited itself to republishing or linking to publicly avail-
able images and newspaper articles without allowing third party comments, would the
balance have fallen the other way? Although combining and consolidating (and thus high-
lighting) disparate sources of publicly available information has a privacy impact (as the
Google Spain74 case has famously determined), the harmful consequences to CG would
have been reduced and McCloskey’s public interest arguments on the basis of journalistic
activity may have had a chance of success.
The decision of the Strasbourg court in Satakunnan75 should be noted however. In
Finland, the tax details of citizens are publicly available and the applicant companies had
published a magazine containing data on 1.2 million persons’ taxable income and assets,
and developed a SMS search tool using the data. The Strasbourg court refused to overturn
the Finnish court’s decision that publishing taxation information to such an extent could not
be considered as journalism but was the unlawful processing of personal data.76 The
decision leaves open the question of how much publicly available information will need
to be published in order to tip the balance into unlawful processing, and certainly seems
to ignore the view that the acquisition and exchange of information can be an integral
part of freedom of speech and the creation of knowledge.77 In a strongly worded dissenting
opinion, Judge Tsotsoria said that:
Establishing a quantitative framework for publicly available information and limiting the
freedom guaranteed by Article 10 on this ground does not correspond to the notion of a “press-
ing social need”.78
Having reviewed this selection of case-law, Jordan feels none-the-wiser as to the circum-
stances in which she would be deemed to have a reasonable expectation of privacy,
whether she can control any inappropriate use of information that she posts on the Internet,
or if she can free herself from identiﬁcation and proﬁling by digital technology. She doubts
that any of the conduct at the party would satisfy the requirements of the offence or tort of
harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.79 She decides to take an
alternative approach.
74Case C-131/12 Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez [2014].
75Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v Finland (App No 931/13) ECHR 21 July
2015.
76ibid 17 [68].
77Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, ‘Is Data Speech?’ (2014) 66 Stan L Rev 57, 60.
78Satakunnan (n 75), 31 [10].
791997 c.40, ss1(1), 2 and 3.
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Taking privacy into her own hands: controlling, blocking and lying
What can Jordan do if she wants to take matters into her own hands, and become a ‘privacy
vigilante’?80 She already uses an ad-blocker and a tracker detector,81 and an internet
browser which automatically deletes cookies on shutdown and lets her express her prefer-
ence not to be tracked by websites.82 Friends suggest that she use the Tor network which
protects against Internet surveillance by distributing transactions over several places on
the Internet, so no single point links to a user’s destination; the network is used by journal-
ists, bloggers, activists and whistleblowers among others.83 She researches this further and
discovers that, in terms of technical strategies, computer science researchers have tended to
distinguish between tools such as peer-to-peer networks, proxies and anonymising net-
works such as Tor which aim to hide or disguise information and which require the use
of third party infrastructure, and tools and techniques involving obfuscation and/or disinfor-
mation and which only require changes at the client-side.84 The ﬁrst category of solutions
has been criticised for forcing the user to impose unwanted trust onto the third party enti-
ties85 and as Bernal points out, such solutions are ‘relatively obscure’ and only protect those
‘in the know’.86 In addition, Jordan ﬁnds media articles suggesting that Tor and the like
could be tainted with an association with criminal activities such as drug dealing and
child abuse.87 For these reasons, she decides to focus her attention on a selection of tech-
niques that could, in theory, be implemented by her individually.
Personal data stores
First, she might attempt to take control of her personal information by using a personal data
store (PDS), a form of trust network described by Pentland as ‘a combination of a computer
network that keeps track of user permissions for each piece of personal data, and a legal
contract that speciﬁes both what can and can’t be done with the data, and what happens
if there is a violation of the permissions’.88 PDSs are said by their promoters to enable indi-
viduals to take back control over their personal data and manage their relationship with sup-
pliers. In particular, PDSs aim to provide information as a tool in the hands of the individual
(as opposed a tool in the hands of business).89 But despite the prediction of signiﬁcant
80Marion Oswald, ‘Seek, and Ye Shall Not Necessarily Find: The Google Spain Decision, the Surveil-
lant on the Street and Privacy Vigilantism’ in K O’Hara et al (eds), Digital Enlightenment Yearbook
(IOS Press 2014) 99–115.
81Such as Ghostery <https://www.ghostery.com/en/why-ghostery/for-individuals/> accessed March
2016.
82Such as Mozilla Firefox <https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/ﬁrefox/dnt/> accessed March 2016.
83<https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en> accessed March 2016.
84S T Peddinti and N Saxena, ‘Web Search Query Privacy: Evaluating Query Obfuscation and Anon-
ymizing Networks’ (2014) 22 J Comput Sec 155, 157.
85ibid 156.
86Paul Bernal, Internet Privacy Rights (Cambridge University Press 2014) 135.
87MWard, ‘Tor’sMost Visited Hidden Sites Host Child Abuse Images’BBCNews (30 December 2014)
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-30637010> accessed March 2016; ‘Peeling the Onion – Tor’s
Criminal Content Revealed’ InfoSecurity Magazine (5 March 2014) <http://www.infosecurity-
magazine.com/news/peeling-the-onion-tors-criminal-content-revealed/> accessed March 2016.
88Alex Pentland, Social Physics: How Good Ideas Spread – The Lessons from a New Science (The
Penguin Press, New York 2014) 182.
89Ctrl-Shift, ‘Personal Information Management Services: An Analysis of an Emerging Market’ June
2014, 11.
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market growth in PDSs,90 service providers would need to be prepared to change their
business models fundamentally if PDSs are to fulﬁl their potential.
The process of the user attaching terms and conditions to the data at the point of sharing
required by PDSs raises numerous questions around contract formation and incorporation
of terms, ‘battle of forms’ and offers and counter-offers, not to mention the challenges of
negotiating in any meaningful way with online service providers.91 How would observed
or derived data be handled: by the data subject’s terms, by new regulation or both?
There would have to be limits on the scope of the user’s terms, for instance, attempting
to restrict use of information for journalistic purposes in the public interest. The position
regarding consumer rights would need to be considered. The UK’s Consumer Rights Act
does not apply to situations where consumers exchange personal data in return for access
to digital content.92 The EU’s draft Directive on digital content would extend protection
to these types of exchanges93 although in responding to these proposals, a number of
issues have been raised. For instance, the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority has
said:
‘When the form of payment is data rather than money, the ‘value’ of the data may be difﬁcult
to assess given that the value of data is a ﬂuid value depending on various factors (the same
data may be more valuable, for example, to one trader than to another and may depend on
other data available to the trader). So how is the value of data assessed? A practical
example may be the case of an app which is ‘purchased’ for, say, £1, £5 or through data
exchange: if the contract is silent, how does one assess against what standard the digital
content should be assessed?’94
Furthermore, dialogue around PDSs tends to include the assumption that individuals ‘own’
their information, a concept not (yet) recognised by English law.95 A property-based
approach to information and privacy has been argued for as reﬂecting most people’s attitude
towards their data and creating ‘a shared understanding of the trust based nature of the
relationship between the in personam rightholder and the in rem collector of information’.96
This however is by no means an accepted approach. While Samuelson argues for protection
akin to trade secrecy law,97 Lemley believes that creating an intellectual property right in
personal data ‘is a very bad idea’98 (‘politically unsaleable’, risky to the public domain
and easily signed away through contract).
The control promised by PDSs may in any event be somewhat illusory. Lazaro and
Métayer point out that control cannot be an absolute protection and that it is somewhat
90ibid 7.
91See Dave Murray-Rust, Kieron O’Hara, Marion Oswald, Max Van Kleek and Nigel Shadbolt,
‘Privacy by Obfuscation with Personal Data Management Architectures: Possibilities and Constraints’
Workshop on Economics and Surveillance, ACMWeb Science, June 30, 2015, Oxford, UK section 4.
922015, c.15 s 33.
93Proposal for a Directive on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content,
2015/0287 (COD).
94The CMA’s response to the UK Government’s call for views on the draft directives on the online
sales of digital content and tangible goods, 15 February 2016, 2.
95The Court of Appeal in Fairstar Heavy Transport v Adkins [2013] EWCACiv 886 declined to deter-
mine whether there was any proprietary right in information.
96Christopher Rees, ‘Who Owns Our Data?’ (2014) 30(1) Computer L Sec Rev 75, 79. See also Chris-
topher Rees, ‘Tomorrow’s privacy: personal information as property’ (2013) 3(4) IDPL 220, 221.
97Pamela Samuelson, ‘Privacy as Intellectual Property?’ (1999–2000) 52 Stan L Rev 1125.
98Mark A Lemley, ‘Private Property’ (1999–2000) 52 Stan L Rev 1545, 1547.
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paradoxical that ‘the term “control” as interpreted by lawyers seems to be used as a key
privacy principle in situations where “control”, in the technical sense, is effectively relin-
quished (or at least shared)’.99 Subject to the development of a supportive legal and com-
mercial ecosystem (a not insigniﬁcant task), a PDS could allow Jordan to regain a degree
of control over her personal data and its further dissemination on the Internet, but only if
she is placed in a position to monitor compliance and to enforce the contractual agree-
ment. A PDS, combined with the suppression of links to irrelevant or inadequate infor-
mation pursuant to the Google Spain decision, may contribute to increasing her relative
obscurity on the Internet. However, a PDS can be effective only where Jordan has a
relationship with those wishing to use her personal information. At the party, she has
no such relationship. Her concerns relate not just to the use of data but also to the
ability of known and unknown individuals to identify, proﬁle, and to intrude upon her.
How can she inﬂuence their activities when she may have no knowledge of them and
no means to give meaningful consent or otherwise? Hildebrandt believes that real user
empowerment is dependent upon moving away from sources of information that data
controllers are willing to provide, instead giving individuals the ability to engage in
‘counter-proﬁling’ in order to increase front-end transparency of proﬁling, for instance,
‘employing inference machines to infer the monetary value of the data and the manipul-
ability of persons that match speciﬁc patterns’.100 Hildebrandt recognises, however there
is currently no legal obligation to provide the socio-technical infrastructure required for
counter-proﬁling.101
Blocking identiﬁable data
Secondly, blocking. Jordan would want to see social media and lifelogging technologies
take steps to block, pixelate or ‘Shrekify’102 the public display of any recognisable
image of her unless she has given permission.103 At the party itself, Jordan might deploy
a Google Glass blocker, which impersonates the Wi-ﬁ network, sends a ‘deauthorisation’
command and cuts the headset’s internet connection,104 and she could don a ‘Privacy
Visor’, prototype glasses which use light-reﬂecting material to disrupt facial recognition
technology.105
In terms of the practices of internet service providers, Jordan might take some encour-
agement from recent enforcement actions taken by EU data protection regulators in relation
99Christophe Lazaro and Daniel Le Métayer, ‘Control over Personal Data: True Remedy or Fairy
Tale?’ (2015) 12(1) SCRIPTed 4, 30.
100Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (Edward Elgar 2015) 223.
101ibid.
102An algorithm that could automatically replace faces in photos with artiﬁcial ones: Tereza Pultarova
‘‘Shrekifying’ Faces Could Protect Privacy Online’ Engineering & Technology, August/September
2015, 20–21.
103See for instance C Gurrin, R Albatal, H Joho and K Ishii ‘A Privacy by Design Approach to Life-
logging’ in K O’Hara et al (eds), Digital Enlightenment Yearbook (IOS Press 2014) 68.
104A Greenberg, ‘Cut Off Glassholes’ Wi-Fi With This Google Glass Detector’ Wired (3 June 2014)
<http://www.wired.com/2014/06/ﬁnd-and-ban-glassholes-with-this-artists-google-glass-detector/>
accessed March 2016.
105C Osborne, ‘Privacy Visor Which Blocks Facial Recognition Software Set for Public Release’ ZDNet
(10 August 2015) <http://www.zdnet.com/article/privacy-visor-which-blocks-facial-recognition-software-
set-for-public-release/> accessed March 2016.
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to the data collection practices of Google106,107 and Facebook108, and against Facebook’s
‘real-name’ policy.109 It has been reported that the need for an opt-in has prevented the
launch of Facebook’s Moments facial recognition app in Europe.110 Such enforcement
activities have laid particular emphasis on the provision by the service provider of ever
more detailed information to enable the user to give consent to the processing of their per-
sonal data. Ensuring such consent is meaningful rather than ‘non-negotiable, non-informed,
pressurised and illusory’111 remains a challenge however, an example being the copying by
brands of photos posted on social media, justiﬁed on the grounds of ‘implied consent’ given
by the user by tagging a company in their posts and the site’s often opaque terms of use.112
Indeed, this focus on consent risks ignoring the larger issue of the legality of data combi-
nation practices, instead shifting responsibility onto the user for controlling the way in
which their personal data is processed.113
Importantly, the user may not be the individual who is being photographed or identiﬁed.
Selvadurai and Hörnle comment that:
Big data and face recognition technologies [FRT] raise the question of whether consent is a
meaningful justiﬁcation for the processing of facial recognition data. The user is by deﬁnition
unsure what he or she is consenting to. Consent to publication and republication of a photo on
another proﬁle, for example, is one thing, but aggregating information across the Internet and
re-identifying individuals through face recognition technology from a single tagged photo goes
much further and beyond the imagination of the average user. Powerful FRT means that users
cannot foresee how and by whom their personal identifying information will be used, hence the
limits of consent to justify such processing.…Hence users are in need of protected, private
spaces where FRT cannot be used.114
Such a protected space seems some way off. In the US, privacy groups have withdrawn
from talks on a voluntary code of conduct for companies that use facial recognition tech-
nologies on the basis that ‘industry stakeholders were unable to agree on any concrete scen-
ario where companies should employ facial recognition only with a consumer’s
106Dutch Data Protection Authority, Press Release 9 July 2015 <https://cbpweb.nl/en/news/privacy-
campaign-google-following-possible-sanction-dutch-dpa> accessed March 2016.
107For an assessment of regulators’ reaction to Google’s new privacy policy, see Judith Rauhofer, ‘Of
Men and Mice: Should the EU Data Protection Authorities’ Reaction to Google’s New Privacy Policy
Raise Concern for the Future of the Purpose Limitation Principle?’ (2015) 1(1) EDPLR 5.
108Dutch Data Protection Authority, Press Release 6 May 2015 <https://cbpweb.nl/en/news/facebook-
provides-information-after-formal-demand-dutch-dpa> accessed March 2016.
109J Fioretti, ‘German Regulator Orders Facebook to Allow Pseudonyms’ (28 July 2015) <http://
www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/28/us-facebook-germany-pseudonyms-idUSKCN0Q21U620150728>
accessed March 2016.
110D Seetharaman ‘Facial-Recognition Concerns Keep Facebook ‘Moments’ from Europe’ Wall
Street Journal (18 June 2015) <http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/06/18/facial-recognition-concerns-
keep-facebook-moments-from-europe/> accessed March 2016; A description of Moments can be
found at <https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/06/introducing-moments/> accessed March 2016.
111Lillian Edwards, ‘Privacy, Law, Code and Social Networking Sites’ in Ian Brown (ed), Research
Handbook on Governance of the Internet (Edward Elgar 2013) 332.
112S Ember and R Abrams ‘On Instagram and Other Social Media, Redeﬁning ‘User Engagement’
(The New York Times, 20 September 2015) <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/media/
retailers-use-of-their-fans-photos-draws-scrutiny.html> accessed March 2016.
113Rauhofer (n 107) 14.
114Niloufer Selvadurai and Julia Hörnle, ‘Just a Face in the Crowd’ (2015) OUPBlog <http://blog.oup.
com/2015/06/face-recognition-technologies-identity-international-law/> accessed March 2016.
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permission’.115 Kotsios proposes a solution that would appoint social media sites as the
guardians of privacy by making them responsible for contacting third persons for per-
mission to display an identiﬁable photo. This solution takes as its hypothesis however
the suggestion that people will consent to facial recognition by the sites, resulting in
further identiﬁable information being collected by commercial bodies.116 As Kotsios
acknowledges, there are signiﬁcant interoperability questions and the issue of the person
who cannot be contacted via social media because they do not have an account.117 The
Working Party has previously advised that:
Even if the SNS had the means to contact the non-user and inform this non-user about the exist-
ence of personal data relating to him/her, a possible e-mail invitation to join the SNS in order to
access these personal data would violate the prohibition laid down in Article 13.4 of the ePriv-
acy Directive on the sending of unsolicited electronic messages for direct marketing
purposes.118
In addition, tracking of non-users has been the subject of recent enforcement action by EU
data protection authorities.119
Should Jordan take matters into her own hands therefore and deploy the Google Glass
blocker, she may well fall foul of computer misuse legislation if she did not have the
consent of the network owner. In the UK, there would be a risk of a section 3 offence
under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 – an unauthorised act with intent to impair the oper-
ation of any computer. Instead she might take up a suggestion made by Haddadi et al – the
‘continuous broadcast of a Do-Not-Track beacon from smart devices carried by individuals
who prefer not to be subjected to image recognition by wearable cameras’, although the
success of this would depend on regulatory enforcement and whether device providers
received and conformed to such requests.120 Jordan has no wish however to be forced to
broadcast her presence at the party to avoid image recognition. As for wearing the
Privacy Visor, as well as drawing undue attention to herself, she thinks she looks ridiculous!
Obfuscation technologies
Finally, obfuscation, by which technology is used to produce false or misleading data in an
attempt, as Murray-Rust et al put it, to ‘cloud’ the lens of the observer.121 This is the tech-
nological equivalent of what most of us will have already done online: missing off the ﬁrst
line of our address when we enter our details into an online form; subtly changing our birth-
day; deliberately giving an incorrect email address in exchange for a money-off voucher. A
115Privacy Advocates Statement on NTIA Face Recognition Process, 16 June 2015 https://www.eff.
org/document/privacy-advocates-statement-ntia-face-recognition-process accessed March 2016.
116Kotsios (n 20) 184.
117Kotsios (n 20) 185.
118Opinion 5/2009 (n 54) 8.
119Natasha Lomas, ‘Facebook Ordered to Stop Tracking Non-users in France’ TechCrunch (9
February 2016) <http://techcrunch.com/2016/02/09/facebook-ordered-to-stop-tracking-non-users-in-
france/> accessed March 2016.
120H Haddadi, A Alomainy, I Brown, ‘Quantiﬁed Self and the Privacy Challenge in Wearables’
Society for Computers & Law (5 August 2014) <http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=ed38111> accessed
March 2016.
121D Murray-Rust, M Van Kleek, L Dragan, N Shadbolt, ‘Social Palimpsests – Clouding the Lens of
the Personal Panopticon’ in K O’Hara et al (eds) Digital Enlightenment Yearbook (IOS Press 2014)
76.
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PDS could, for instance, be used to add ‘chaff’ (adding multiple data points amongst the
real ones), hide real search queries among many ‘ghost’ ones122 or simulate real behaviour
such as going on holiday. Obfuscation could obstruct stylometric analysis (used to attribute
authorship to anonymous texts) by, for instance, changing the text so that there is no dis-
tinctive style.123 On the face of it, obfuscation may seem to be an attractive alternative
approach, providing individuals with a degree of control over how much ‘real’ information
is released and some conﬁdence that often unknown proﬁling activities will be hampered.
Brunton and Nissembaum note that obfuscation ‘offers the possibility of cover from the
scrutiny of third parties and data miners for those without other alternatives’.124 They
admit that obfuscation is not a strong privacy system like encryption; instead it can
enable an individual to assert a sense of autonomy, or can provide tools for protest or
obscurity.125
Obfuscation raises ethical issues.126 Do the ends justify the arguably ‘dishonest’means?
Does noise-generation inappropriately waste resources and ‘pollute’ important data ﬂows?
Are obfuscators free-riding on others’ data? Brunton and Nissenbaum conclude that ‘obfus-
cation offers a means of striving for balance defensible when it functions to resist domina-
tion of the weaker by the stronger’.127 That may well be so but there could still be
consequences for an individual. Murray-Rust et al distinguish between ofﬁcial data,
where obfuscation may be a criminal offence, and other data that can be obfuscated
‘without legal consequence’128 a rather stark distinction. First, on the civil side, those
who use social media sites and other online services are required to agree to terms and con-
ditions, which almost without fail will govern the collection of customer data, and will often
include identity disclosure requirements or ‘real name’ policies. Obfuscation technologies
threaten the data collection business model on which many online businesses rely. Terms
and conditions can be updated to prohibit obfuscation methods, and technology designed
to enforce the terms and to identify bots: ‘Those in the surveillance business respond to neu-
tralization efforts with their own innovations which are then responded to in a re-occurring
patterns… innovations may offer only temporary solutions.’129 Secondly, might Jordan be
committing fraud or a computer misuse offence by using obfuscation technologies?130 A
theoretical and some might say far-fetched risk at this point in time maybe, but one that
many less technologically savvy individuals may be reluctant to take.
122See the description of ‘TrackMeNot’ in Finn Brunton and Helen Nissenbaum, Obfuscation: A
User’s Guide for Privacy and Protest (The MIT Press 2015) 13–14.
123ibid 31–33.
124Finn Brunton and Helen Nissenbaum, ‘Vernacular Resistance to Data Collection and Analysis: A
Political Theory of Obfuscation’ (2011) 16(5) First Monday <http://ﬁrstmonday.org/article/view/
3493/2955> accessed March 2016.
125Brunton and Nissenbaum (n 122) 58.
126Brunton and Nissenbaum (n 122) 63–70.
127Brunton and Nissenbaum (n 122) 70.
128Murray-Rust et al (n 121) 90.
129Gary T Marx, ‘ATack in the Shoe and Taking Off the Shoe: Neutralization and Counter-Neutral-
ization’ (2009) 6(3) Dynamics, Surveillance and Society 294–306, 299.
130In England and Wales, fraud offences have been criticised as being so broad as to effectively crim-
inalise lying (D Ormerod, ‘The Fraud Act 2006 – Criminalising Lying’ [2007] Crim LR 193); Where
terms and conditions prohibit the use of obfuscation technologies in order to access data held by the
service, arguably attempting to do so would be unauthorised (even if the user did not in fact read the
terms), thus satisfying the conditions for commission of the s1 offence under the UK’s Computer
Misuse Act 1990.
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Jordan concludes that obfuscation methods may provide her with ‘cover’ online and a
means to prevent individual exposure. Overall however, although all these privacy vigilante
methods have their place, she questions whether they place too much responsibility on the
individual for privacy protection. Of themselves, they seem to be more of a sticking plaster
against the privacy problems created by the existing system. She wishes to ﬁnd a way that
the ‘mere fact that a person can be seen by someone does not automatically mean that he or
she can legally be forced to be subject to being seen by everyone’131 can become a principle
universally recognised online.
Jordan’s ﬁghtback – or how to make the large party more intimate in the twenty-
ﬁrst century
It has been argued that cyberspace is special and therefore we need a different approach to law-
making for it,132 although perhaps it is the consequences of the cyber, rather than any particu-
lar ‘space’, that requires a different approach. Technology and social media increasinglymakes
information public that would have been private in the past and it is specious to equate this to a
homeowner failing to draw the curtains over a window.133 (In any event, we do not expect
someone to press their noses against our un-curtained window or to look around the back
garden because we have left the gate open!) Digital and online technologies can give
access to information about an individual that she assumed was hidden, anonymised or
hard to ﬁnd, more akin to a physical search of home or person (an activity that when done
by the State has traditionally been subject to strict criteria or a warrant). Social media sites
are commonly regarded as just another form of public space, although unlike a real-world
public space where there is generally no systematic monitoring, social media is characterised
by explicit observation of content and interactions.134 The expansion of social networking
over the last decade has seen privacy-by-default system settings turn into disclosure-by-
default; thus ‘the boundaries between the public and private spheres become blurred’.135
European case-law has been edging towards a more nuanced appreciation of the private
nature of certain information generally viewable online, although the concept of ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’ causes considerable contextual uncertainty, and the courts have
been prepared to allow technological advances to impact upon the boundaries of public
and private, sometimes to the detriment of the individual. PDSs, obfuscation technologies
and blocking methods, although available to the informed user, have as yet, no settled legal
or commercial infrastructure to support their widespread use.
This section reviews four approaches that have been put forward by scholars to target
legitimate privacy harms. First, Bernal argues for a rights-based approach to the protection
of autonomy online as, he says, data protection has become a piece of technical legislation
‘more about the regulation of data ﬂow than the protection of individuals’ privacy’.136 One
131Solove (n 10) 553 quoting from Saunders v American Broadcasting Companies 978 P.2d 67, 69–
70 (Cal. 1999) ‘”The concept of ‘seclusion’ is relative. The mere fact that a person can be seen by
someone does not automatically mean that he or she can legally be forced to be subject to being
seen by everyone.”’.
132Chris Reed, Making Laws for Cyberspace (Oxford University Press 2012) 26.
133See Huff (n 18) [10].
134Stefan Straus and Michael Nentwich, ‘Social Network Sites, Privacy and the Blurring Boundary
Between Public and Private spaces’ (2013) Science and Public Policy 726.
135ibid.
136Bernal (n 86) 223.
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such right would be the right to compartmentalise any number of separate identities137, an
approach related to Tene’s disaggregated identities.138 Giving the unmasking of NightJack
as an example, Bernal also argues for a right to maintain anonymity online, with such a right
involving the protection of links between online and ofﬂine identities.139 Bernal believes
that ‘the balancing of rights in coming to any decision [to reveal links] should be weighted
heavily in favour of not revealing the links’.140 The rights put forward by Bernal are not, he
admits, legally enforceable but something more akin to natural rights141 and additional
steps would be needed to interpret and enforce these rights, and to deﬁne exceptions and
the treatment of competing interests.
Secondly, Richards and Hartzog believe that privacy law’s legacy of harm and control is
pessimistic and worn out, arguing that trust can add force to privacy concepts by taking
inspiration from the law of ﬁduciaries.142 They would recognise the role of trust in all infor-
mation relationships, although with higher duties of care and loyalty being imposed where
there is greater trust or potential for exposure.143 Hartzog has previously argued for the level
of practical obscurity given to information online to be used by the courts to determine if
information is eligible for privacy protection.144 The later article goes further and suggests
that privacy law should embrace the concept of discretion, the expectation that information
will stay within certain networks even if it does not stay completely conﬁdential.145 This
would recognise the blurred lines between public and private:
Regulators, legislators and judges should create some kind of obligation on entrustees to
obfuscate disclosures such that the general public or speciﬁcally unauthorized parties are
unlikely to ﬁnd or understand entrusted information, even when the information is not strictly
conﬁdential,
with the enhancement of tort law offering a potential route to implementation.146
Bambauer also uses tort law to consider information-age privacy harms, speciﬁcally
proposing adaptations to the US tort of intrusion upon seclusion.147 She criticises
privacy laws and theories that attempt to constrain the dissemination and re-use of personal
information as failing to account for ‘the signiﬁcant social costs of propertizing facts’.148
Instead, Bambauer proposes that the intrusion tort ‘should provide recourse, not for the cre-
ation of personal data, which is a necessary byproduct of well-functioning technologies, but
137Bernal (n 86) 249.
138Omer Tene, ‘Me, Myself and I: Aggregated and Disaggregated Identities on Social Networking
Services’ (2013) 8(2) JICLT 118–32.
139Bernal (n 86) 256–57.
140Bernal (n 86) 257.
141Bernal (n 86) ix.
142Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog, ‘Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law’ (3 September 2015)
34–35. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2655719> accessed March 2016.
143ibid 36.
144Woodrow Hartzog and Frederic Stutzman, ‘The Case for Online Obscurity’ (2013) 101 Calif L Rev
1. The article argues that information is obscure online if it lacks one or more key factors that are
essential to discovery or comprehension: (1) search visibility, (2) unprotected access, (3) identiﬁ-
cation, and (4) clarity.
145Richards and Hartzog (n 142) 39.
146Richards and Hartzog (n 142) 40.
147Bambauer (n 12) 230. The tort of intrusion imposes liability on anyone who intentionally intrudes
on the seclusion of another if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
148Bambauer (n 12) 209.
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for the observation of that data’.149 She distinguishes between capture and observation, i.e.
between automated data processing (not caught by her restated tort) and observation related
to a particular data subject.150 Bambauer lays particular stress on the importance of free
ﬂow of information and her restated tort151 is based around unexposed information:
Information that is voluntarily shared with an individual or the public can be observed without
offense by that individual, in the case of the former, and by any individual in the case of the
latter. The offensiveness element winds up turning on whether the observed could have and
should have expected their information to be exposed to the observer.152
The proposal therefore appears to continue the hard-line approach as regards information
exposed in ‘public’, with no acknowledgement of the blurring of the boundaries between
public and private. Such exposed information would not qualify for protection under the
restated tort, even though observation, in particular through technical means, may well
be unexpected to the observed and lead to investigation of the individual and so to intrusion.
Finally, Austin criticises reliance on tort liability and its focus on wrongs, instead pro-
posing that privacy should be thought of in terms of powers.153 Taking ideas from the law of
search and seizure, Austin proposes that the relationship of power that the surveilling party
holds over the other should be recognised and regulated accordingly (the ‘power-over’
analysis).154 Linked to this is Austin’s ‘power-to’ analysis, that the law should facilitate
individuals’ ability to do things that they otherwise would not be able to, rather than pro-
tecting them from harms.155 Austin suggests that such a restatement would lead to positive
privacy obligations being imposed on information intermediaries to secure the conditions
for individual self-presentation156 and to broad access rights for individuals to data proﬁling
techniques.157
A new private: misuse of the digital person
Building on the four proposals outlined above, this article suggests an alternative model that
could tackle some of the modern day Jordan’s privacy concerns. The model recognises that
information or activities do not have to be secret or unexposed for privacy issues to occur,
while avoiding a structure that involves the deletion or hiding of information already avail-
able in the public domain. Instead, it considers what might be the most personal or ‘private’
of information or activities, even if these are exposed online or digitally, and how an indi-
vidual might be protected from inappropriate intrusion based on the exploitation of this
information to de-anonymise, make links or generate presumptions. Protection would not
rely upon technological functionality or concepts of obscurity online (often dependent on
the individual’s knowledge of such technological functionality) although efforts to
149Bambauer (n 12) 209–10.
150Bambauer (n 12) 249.
151One who intentionally observes another is subject to liability to the other if the observation would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person Bambauer (n 12) 245.
152Bambauer (n 12) 245.
153Lisa M Austin, ‘Enough about Me: Why Privacy Is About Power, Not Consent (or Harm)’ in
Austin Sarat (ed) A World Without Privacy (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 177.
154ibid 160–61.
155ibid 160.
156ibid 180.
157ibid 182.
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obscure information could be a helpful factor in determining difﬁcult issues on the bound-
ary. The model would move away from the concept of data controller, preferring that
responsibilities should apply to all. Tort law would appear to provide a promising
avenue for implementation although Austin’s criticisms of a tort approach are acknowl-
edged, and consideration given to how a new model could move away from the concept
of harm. In terms of intermediaries, publication or communication would be a mere
factual requirement for the tort, reﬂecting Oster’s reconceptualisation of intermediary liab-
ility for defamation.158 Defences relating to ‘innocence’ would be limited to intermediaries
which had not participated in, facilitated, activated or controlled the misuse.
Could the tort of misuse of private information be adapted to reﬂect above? Misuse of
private information was conﬁrmed to be a tort in England and Wales by Tugendhat J in
Vidal-Hall.159 The judge also stated that damages for distress are recoverable in a claim
for this tort160 and as seen in the CG case, a tortious claim can be brought against individ-
uals and organisations alike. A new understanding of ‘private’ would be required however
(replacing the reasonable expectation of privacy test) and the above model might be better
summarised as misuse of the digital person. It would include the following elements:
(a) Certain information about individuals (see (b)) exposed digitally or available to the
‘masses’ on the Internet, or which can be generated from such information, should
no longer be regarded as ‘public’ in the sense of there being no privacy in respect
of it;
(b) The above principle would apply to digital information/information online that rep-
resents the fundamentals of a person (such as name, location, family, health, beliefs
and image, see the suggestions in Figure 1). The extent to which information about
a person’s job, public persona and criminal/civil offences fall within the fundamen-
tals of a person would have to be agreed (see Areas marked * on Figure 1). This
would provide an opportunity to develop clearer statutory principles as to when,
for instance, offences recede into the past and become part of a person’s private
life161 (and so part of the fundamentals of a person). This model could exist in par-
allel with the ‘right to be forgotten’ inGoogle Spain; the principles surrounding the
fundamentals of a person may serve to inform the circumstances in which links to
material should be deleted;
(c) The fundamentals of a digital person would be regarded as ‘private’; ‘private’ as
applied in this model would not depend upon information being hidden or
unseen but on whether it fell within one of categories representing the fundamen-
tals of a person. If it did, only certain actions would be permitted in respect of it,
thus reﬂecting Austin’s concerns over the power that the surveilling party holds
over the other and so regulating at the point of action;
(d) Discernible digital information that falls within the fundamentals of a person (for
instance, a blog in which a person expresses their views and talks about their life)
can be viewed, read, searched, stored, linked to and reported upon, but not further
used (unless an exception applied) to generate new information or intelligence
158Jan Oster, ‘Communication, defamation and liability of intermediaries’ (2015) 35(2) Legal Studies
348, 349.
159Judith Vidal-Hall & ors v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB) [70].
160ibid [74].
161R(L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Secretary of State for the Home Department
intervening) [2009] UKSC 3 [27].
22 M. Oswald
about an individual that falls within the fundamentals of a person (proﬁling the
person based on blog contents in this example);
(e) It would not be permitted (unless an exception applied) to generate new information
or intelligence about an individual that falls within the fundamentals of a person, i.e.
information that was not already apparent from the disclosed information. Conse-
quentially this would mean, for instance, that it would not be permitted to use
facial recognition to identify an individual from an anonymous image, identify an
anonymous author of a blog, track location from Tweets or from location data gen-
erated by a smart phone to try to determine residence, or deduce health conditions
from a ﬁtness app for the purposes of a life insurance quote;
(f) Application of the above principles would not depend upon falling within the deﬁ-
nition of ‘data controller’ under the DPA; the rules would apply to all;
(g) Public interest exceptions (for journalistic activities and media freedoms in particu-
lar162) must apply. If an exception were to be based on consent, this would require
Figure 1. Fundamentals of a digital person.
162See András Koltay, ‘The Concept of Media Freedom Today: NewMedia, New Editors and the Tra-
ditional Approach of the Law’ (2015) 7(1) J Med L, 36 exploring the extent to which new media
players might claim protection under the right to media freedom.
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careful crafting in order to avoid the unavoidable and increasingly meaningless
‘click-to-agree’ approach to privacy compliance that tends to exist today, and con-
sideration given to what additional powers individuals would require in order to
rebalance the relationship with surveillers.
The advantages of the above model (and a number of issues) might be said to include
the following:
(i) It is technology-neutral. The principles in (d) and (e) above consider the elements
of a person’s identity deserving of privacy protection rather than regulating par-
ticular technology that might interfere with privacy;
(ii) It can tackle many of the privacy problems that Solove identiﬁes in his Taxon-
omy of Privacy163 – surveillance, interrogation, aggregation, identiﬁcation,
disclosure, distortion, intrusion, decisional interference – without the need to
deﬁne an exhaustive list of these problems or activities. Instead the approach
focuses on the aspects of an individual which are the most fundamentally
personal;
(iii) Public interest and other exceptions can be determined based on cultural and
societal norms. This model requires the public interest to be assessed by the
person or organisation responsible for the activity (appealable to the court or reg-
ulator). This is not to underestimate the challenges of determining appropriate
public interest exceptions and the jurisdictional conﬂicts that would arise. It is
beyond the scope of this article to explore this in any detail. Sufﬁce to say that
the question of whether what some might regard as trivia, gossip or entertainment
should be regarded as in the public interest would have to be determined
decisively164;
(iv) The model does not attempt to hide or delete information that is already available
in public, thus having regard to freedom of speech considerations. It would not
regulate the taking of digital photographs per se or the posting of these online
unless the individual was identiﬁed from the image. However unpalatable the
site may seem, ‘Women who eat on tubes’ would not of itself be prevented but
the identiﬁcation of the anonymous women in the photographs would be regulated
under the new model.
Information and images that relate to an individual’s job or public persona
would not be regulated unless the matter fell within Areas * on Figure 1.
Thus the information exposed in the Huff case would most likely fall outside
the model, not because of the nature of the technology but because of the
work-related nature of the information. Determining the boundaries of these
Areas has the potential to cause considerable uncertainty and debate however.
Identiﬁed photographs of Jordan lunching with her children would seem to
fall squarely within fundamentals of a person. On the other hand, Jordan’s
attendance at Gatsby’s large party, no doubt a glittering ‘A-list’ affair, would
most likely fall outside Area *, a determination to displease Jordan but probably
the right one;
163Solove (n 5) 103–70.
164See Rebecca Moosavian, ‘Deconstructing “Public Interest” in the Article 8 vs Article 10 Balancing
Exercise’ (2014) 6(2) JML 234.
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(v) The model would require online service providers and intermediaries to take a
hard look at their business practices and to implement changes to reﬂect the
new requirements, for instance, to prevent tagging of previously anonymous
digital photographs. The model does not however address all undesirable data
gathering practices (such as the one recently announced by Spotify: a change to
its privacy policy to allow the service to access contacts held on a user’s smart
phone165);
(vi) Although there is a partial overlap with the deﬁnition of sensitive personal data
under EU data protection law, the model is not consent-based (and avoids the
implication that ‘public’ equals consent) nor does it rely on the application of
the data controller deﬁnition.
In terms of translating the above approach into law, Reed argues that the law-maker must
achieve respect for any law operating in cyberspace, and to do so must ensure that the cyber-
space actor recognises the law’s obligations as having some sensible meaning (understand-
able, possible to obey, with a clear connection between the obligations and the law’s
normative aim).166 It should be recognised that the law in cyberspace rarely achieves
control of a user’s activities; instead the primary aim should be to inﬂuence and persuade.167
Inﬂuence and persuasion would be the main aim of the above proposal, bearing in mind the
difﬁculty of enforcement against individual cyberspace actors. Action could be more realis-
tically taken against intermediaries, and in this way, provide a strong incentive for interme-
diaries to change online structures and so indirectly inﬂuence the behaviour of individuals.
It is to be hoped however that a law-maker would be pushing against an open door in
terms of the proposal’s normative aim. The case-law and research reviewed in this article indi-
cate that there is an increasing awareness of the privacy impact of new technologies, and of
the need to revisit the deﬁnitions of public and private as they apply to the Internet. Indeed, a
private member’s Bill sponsored by Liz Saville Roberts MP has at the date of writing had its
ﬁrst reading in the UK House of Commons aimed at consolidating offences relating to digital
crime.168 The Bill also aims to introduce new offences relating to surveillance and monitor-
ing, for instance, using a digital device to repeatedly locate, listen or watch a person without
legitimate purpose169 or to take multiple images of an individual unless it is in the public inter-
est to do so and where the intent was not legitimate.170 These proposals have some similarities
with the model set out in this article, although this model attempts to be technology-neutral
and to focus not on the action – listening, locating or watching – but on what fundamentally
personal elements are created through such activities and how these can be protected. It
reﬂects Miller’s call for consideration
to be given towards digital… components of self as matter of being or part of the self,
not as ‘representational of’ or ‘information about’ persons. Such a shift in thinking is
165Zoe Kleinman, ‘Spotify Says Sorry after Privacy Policy Anger’ BBC News (21 August 2015)
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-34016658> accessed March 2016.
166Reed (n 132) 221.
167Reed (n 132) 222.
168Criminal Offences (Misuse of Digital Technologies and Services)(Consolidation) Bill 2015–16
<http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2015-16/criminaloffencesmisuseofdigitaltechnologiesandservices
consolidation.html> accessed March 2016.
169ibid clause 8.
170ibid clause 10.
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necessary to give personal data ‘ethical weight’ and thus maintain any prospect of
privacy.171
Compliance with such new model may be self-fulﬁlling if the law represented a set of
principles that individual cyberspace actors believed in, or could be persuaded to believe in.
We ourselves might be initially resistant, having become used to environment in which we
can post digital photos of anyone, Tweet comments about others and ‘Google’ someone at
will. We might regard this proposed model as representing ‘a sort of elitist condescension
of, or distaste for, the “masses”’.172 We might therefore need convincing that most of our
day-to-day online activities would not be prevented. Even more strident resistance is likely
to come from those businesses operating in the behavioural advertising ﬁeld, those funded
by such advertising, and those using Big Data analysis of individual proﬁles to inform
decision-making. The model would allow exceptions to the principles to reﬂect acceptable
commercial practices however, with the drafting of such exceptions providing an opportu-
nity for an open and large-scale review of information practices online.
Conclusion
To return to Jordan’s dilemma – whether large parties can still be intimate – this article con-
cludes that they can be, or at least they could be. Social media, Internet search tools, facial
recognition and proﬁling technologies are the digital equivalent of an ever-present long
lens. These digital intrusions are now part of our world, whether real or digital. Jordan
cannot ever hope to be as free from detailed scrutiny in the twenty-ﬁrst century as she
was at Gatsby’s large party in 1925. Our information-rich society has many positives in
terms of transparency, knowledge-dissemination and freedom of speech, yet the exponen-
tial growth in digital and Internet technologies has had a rather invidious effect on percep-
tions of public and private. It is time to question the common assumption that being online
and operating with digital technologies are the equivalent of being seen physically in public.
Being observed on the street is generally down to chance; being connected digitally attracts
a much higher degree of systematic observability, potentially impacting on the relatively
anonymous nature of walking down the street in the real world. The model proposed in
this article recognises this. It does not attempt to prevent the observation taking place.
Instead it proposes that society should deﬁne the things about a person that we care
about the most – the fundamentals of a person – and protect that from undesirable digital
intrusion. In this way, the model could offer a potentially multi-jurisdictional way of inﬂu-
encing attitudes and ultimately changing behaviours.
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